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ABSTRACT
This paper builds a tractable partial equilibrium model in the spirit of Melitz (2003), which incorporates
two dimensions of heterogeneity: firms specific productivity shocks and firm-market specific demand
shocks. The structural parameters of interest are estimated using only cross-sectional data, and counterfactual
experiments regarding the effects of reducing costs, both fixed and marginal, or of trade preferences
(with distortionary Rules of Origin) offered by an importing country are performed. Our counterfactuals
make a case for "trade as aid," as such policies can create a "win-win-win" scenario and are less subject
to the usual worries regarding the efficacy of direct foreign aid. They also suggest that reducing fixed
costs at various levels can be quite effective as export promotion devices, with the exports induced
per dollar spent ranging from .4 to 25.
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When the US granted duty-free and quota-free access to Madagascar under the African
Growth and Opportunity Act 2000, exports from Madagascar exploded, from $170 million
in 2000 to $500 million in 2004. Over the same period, Madagascar's exports to the rest
of the world also increased, from $750 million to $875 million. Similarly, when the EU
granted duty-free and quota-free access to Bangladesh under the Everything But Arms
Initiative in 2001, knitwear exports from Bangladesh to the EU more than doubled, from
$1.3 billion in 2000 to $3 billion in 2004. During the same period of time, knitwear exports
from Bangladesh to the US also increased by $30 million. Much to the surprise of many,
such generous trade preferences resulted not in trade diversion from the rest of the world to
the preference granting markets, but in trade creation to the rest of the world.
The model we develop and estimate in this paper predicts exactly this. Trade preferences
given by one country have positive spillovers on exports to others in the presence of free entry:
preferences given by the EU make the industry more attractive and create entry, and some
of these rms also export to the US. We use customs data from Bangladesh to estimate a
heterogeneous rm model based on the agship model of Melitz (2003), but structured to be
suitable for trade policy applications. Our work takes a heterogeneous rm model literally
and confronts it with micro data and actual trade policies to estimate all of its structural
parameters, including the various levels of xed costs. These xed costs are at the core of
the models and serve as hurdles that productive/fortunate rms choose to jump, while those
that are less so do not. Our paper then uses the estimated model to evaluate the eects of
the dierent kinds of trade polices used in practice. Finally, we compare xed cost subsidies
of various kinds in terms of their eectiveness in promoting exports.
In our model, there are two sources of rm heterogeneity: rm specic productivity
as in Melitz (2003), and rm and market specic demand shocks. This is motivated by the
ndings in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012). They use a rm level data set on Bangladeshi
garment producers and show that rms roughly follow the productivity hierarchy predicted
in Melitz (2003), namely, that rms export to all markets that are easier than the toughest
one they export to, and more productive rms export to tougher markets. However, there
3are a number of violators. While these violators are small in terms of their numbers, they
are large in terms of their output. This can be rationalized by introducing rm and market
specic demand shocks. Such shocks allow us to explain why, given its productivity, a rm
may be very successful in one market but not the other.1 We chose not to use the approach
of Arkolakis (2010), who argues that rms have a choice of penetration costs, which increase
with the number of consumers rms want to access and decrease with the market size. This
allows small exporters to exist, something that would be ruled out by large xed costs of
entry. However, even with his approach, but without the presence of rm and market specic
demand shocks, there would be a very strong positive correlation in the size of the rm's
market shares across export destinations, something we do not see in our data. For this
feature of the data we need rm and market specic demand shocks as postulated here.
In addition to this two dimensional heterogeneity, we also incorporate, albeit simply,
various real world trade policies, such as taris, preferences, rules of origin, and quotas, into
our model. We focus only on the partial equilibrium interaction between Bangladeshi rms
and take the prices and actions of other rms operating in the EU and US as xed.
A closely related paper in the literature is the work of Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011)
(EKK from here on). EKK use customs-level data to understand the patterns of French rms'
exports. Their focus is on constructing the simplest model that ts most of the facts, and not
on trade policy. They also add a reduced form version of Arkolakis's (2010) market access
costs to explain the presence of many small rms with a limited attachment to the market,
as well as rm and market specic demand shocks. We see their work as very complementary
to ours. They look at the \big picture" and try to match the patterns in rm-level exports
by all French rms, in all industries, to all countries. As a result, their model is unsuited
to zooming in on a particular industry and incorporating the relevant trade policy details
as our model is designed to do. Moreover, and perhaps more critically, their model, like
1Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) also postulate the existence of rm and market specic demand
shocks. Kee and Krishna (2008) look at the patterns in the violations and what might explain them.
Armenter and Miklos (2009) assume heterogeneity on the xed cost side. They show that matching the
share of exporters in a standard Melitz model to the data results in having exports per rm far larger than
in the data. Fixed costs heterogeneity helps to reduce this mismatch and explain hierarchy violations.
4that of Chaney (2008), assumes that the mass of rms that enter is xed. In contrast, we
treat the mass of entrants as endogenous. Since we show that this entry margin does most
of the heavy lifting in the adjustments that occur in response to policy, this dierence in
our assumptions is worth emphasizing. Our paper is also related to Bernard, Redding and
Schott (2011), which also features market demand shocks in order to determine the export
behavior of multi-product rms.
Our model has two quite novel policy-relevant predictions. First, it suggests that a small
country can increase its exports quite considerably if granted preferences that are relatively
easy to access, and through cost-reducing policies. We explicitly show how to incorporate
these preferences and the costs, both xed and variable, associated with obtaining them
into a structural model suitable for estimation and policy analysis. Conversely, factors that
raise export costs, like corruption or bad infrastructure, can really take a toll on exports.
Second, the model suggests that preferences to developing countries can have a catalytic
eect. Rather than diverting trade away from other markets as predicted in settings without
xed industry entry costs, preferences given by one developed country can signicantly raise
the exports to the other market. This occurs because preferences raise the return to entry in
the industry. Once a rm has entered, it will serve all markets in which it gets an adequate
demand shock. This eect could be large under circumstances relevant for many developing
countries. The eects of such policies are blunted by the presence of quotas in other markets.
In our estimation, we simulate our model and then match the generated distributions to
those in the data.2 In this paper, we use only cross sectional price and quantity information
and are able to generate bootstrap standard errors for our estimates. The advantage of this
approach is that such cross sectional data is commonly available, which makes our procedure
widely applicable in contrast to the structural dynamic approach taken in recent work, such
as Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011), which is limited to
where data is available over a period of time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the empirical
2Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) take advantage of a natural experiment in trade policy that provides
clean predictions regarding how rms should sort themselves across markets in this augmented Melitz model.
They then show that these predictions are consistent with the data.
5application and the data. Section 3 lays out the model with the details of the derivations
in the Appendix. Section 4 lays out the estimation outline. The results are presented in
Section 5, while policy counterfactuals are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Empirical Application
We use data on the woven apparel sector, and in particular, the subcategory Mens/Boys
Cotton Trousers (HS 620342) in Bangladesh. Firms that produce garments from woven fab-
rics typically use imported or domestically produced fabrics to make apparel items such as
men's cotton shirts or ladies dresses and export the nished products to the EU or US.
Given that fabrics make up more than 50 percent of the costs, the origin of the fabric has
implications for the taris faced by these products in each market due to the existence of
trade preferences in some markets. We will describe the setting in some detail below as it is
the basis for how we incorporate the trade policy environment into our model.3
We focus on this subcategory for two reasons. First, we want to have a relatively homo-
geneous product industry: woven apparel as a whole might be seen as too aggregated. Next,
we want a fair number of rms to be present. Both requirements are met in this sector.4
2.1 The Trade Policy Environment
As summarized in Table 1, there are three main components of the trade environment: the
trade policy of the US and EU, the trade preferences (if any) they grant to Bangladesh,
3The apparel sector of Bangladesh also produces non-woven products, but the production technique and
the trade policy environment faced by the non-woven rms are vastly dierent from those of the woven
apparel producers. Hence, we exclude them from this paper in order not to complicate the modelling and
estimation. Please refer to Kee and Krishna (2008) and Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) for details. In
both papers, we explicitly use the dierences in production technique and trade policies between the woven
and non-woven garment exporters to identify the sorting behavior of rms with unobserved heterogeneity in
productivity and market demand shocks.
4This subcategory accounts for 31.3% of exports to the EU and 15.3% to the US. We have a total of
about 800 rms that export to the US or EU in this category in 2004, and of the rms that export to the
EU, 72.5% meet ROOs and invoke preferences.
6and the Rules of Origin, or ROOs, upon which preferences are conditioned. ROOs specify
conditions on production that must be met in order to obtain origin and thereby qualify
for country specic quotas or trade preferences.5 They can take a variety of forms. The
important thing to note is that, whatever the form, if ROOs are binding, then the choice of
inputs used in production diers from their unconstrained levels. Thus, from an analytical
viewpoint binding ROOs must raise the marginal costs of production. In addition to this,
ROOs can also raise the xed cost of production as compliance with ROOs must be docu-
mented, and a large part of these documentation costs involves learning the ropes and, thus,
can be treated as xed. We explicitly allow for such costs of meeting ROOs in our model.
Table 1: Trade policy environment
Trade Barriers USA EU
(a) Quotas Yes: ROOs required No
(b) MFN taris t20% t12%
Trade Preferences No preferences Zero taris if ROOs met
ROOs Locally assembly Yarn forward rule
The US Environment In 2004, the US had taris of about 20% applied on a Most
Favoured Nations (MFN) basis, as well as Multibre Arrangement (MFA) quota restrictions
in place for the imports of wovens from most developing countries, including Bangladesh.
Quotas under the MFA were country specic, so exporting was contingent on obtaining
origin: unless the good was shown to originate from Bangladesh, it could not enter un-
der its quota. US ROOs regarding apparel products are governed by Section 334 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act. For the purpose of taris and quotas, an apparel product
is considered as originating from a country if it is wholly assembled there.6 No local fabric
requirement is necessary. Thus, the products of a Bangladeshi rm are not penalized if the
rm chooses to use imported fabrics. Bangladesh did not have any trade preferences in the
US and had to compete with producers from other countries, such as India and China. How-
5For a relatively comprehensive and up to date survey see Krishna (2006).
6For details, please, refer to the following website:
http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/usc/ttl19/ch22/subchIII/ptB/sec3592.html
7ever, since there were quotas on other exporters as well, full competition among supplying
countries was still not the case.7 In wovens, 65-75% of Bangladeshi exports to the US in
value terms are under quota. For the subgroup we focus on this number is close to 100%.
These quotas are bilateral and product specic, so rms have no choice but to meet origin.8
A World Bank rm survey in Bangladesh conducted in 2004 gave the quota license price to
be about 7%.
The EU Environment In 2004, the EU had an MFN tari rate of 12%-15% on woven
apparel. Under the \Everything-But-Arms" (EBA) initiative in 2001, Bangladesh, together
with 48 other LDCs, may export a wide range of products, including this particular HS
product, to the EU without any duty and quota, provided ROOs were satised. The EBA
initiative eectively removed any inklings of a quota and granted a 100% preference margin
for garment exports of Bangladesh to the EU. It signicantly improved the market environ-
ment, in which Bangladeshi garment exporters operated.
EU ROOs on apparel products were considerably more restrictive than the US ones.
As such, an item exported to the US may be considered as a product of Bangladesh and
imported under its quota allocation. However, the same item may fail to meet EU ROOs
and would not qualify for the tari preference under EBA. According to Annex II of the
GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) guidebook, which details ROOs of all products,
for an apparel product to be considered as having originated from a country, it must start
its local manufacturing process from yarn9, i.e., the use of imported fabrics would result in
the item failing to meet ROOs for the purpose of tari and quota preferences under GSP or
EBA for the case of LDCs. It would, thus, be subject to MFN taris of about 12% to 15%.
7Note that less competitive countries are at less of a disadvantage in the US than they would be in the
absence of the quota as the quota in eect guarantees them a niche as long as they are not too inecient.
Their ineciency reduces the price of their quota licenses, while the quota licenses of a very competitive
country would be highly priced.
8The ll rate of the quota is close to 80% suggesting the quotas are binding.
9For the details, please refer to the following websites:
EBA user guide: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/ug.htm; Annex II on GSP:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation customs/common/publications/info docs/customs/index en.htm.
8Firms making garments from woven material (woven rms) mostly assemble cut fabrics
into garments. Given the limited domestic supply of woven cloth10, it commands a premium
price, so woven rms can meet ROOs only by paying a roughly 20% higher price for cloth,
which translates into a signicantly higher cost of production, as cloth is the lion's share of
the input cost. The cost of cloth to FOB price is roughly 70-75% for shirts, dresses, and
trousers11, resulting in a 15% cost disadvantage.12 For this reason, not all woven rms choose
to meet ROOs and invoke preferences while exporting to the EU. This feature allows us to
estimate the xed documentation costs of invoking preferences and meeting ROOs.13
China and other better o developing countries faced EU quotas and did not have duty
free access. It is worth noting that even if China and India could export to the EU quota free,
the preferences granted to Bangladesh made the EU a safe haven. This is clearly reected in
the growth of Bangladeshi exports to the EU in this period relative to that to the US. See
Brambilla et al. (2010) for more on China and the MFA.
In 2000 the EU granted Bangladesh SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Coop-
eration) cumulation,14 meaning that as long as 50% of the value added was from Bangladesh,
materials imported from SAARC countries (which included India with plenty of textile pro-
duction) could be used while retaining Bangladeshi origin. Cumulation of origin would have
relaxed the constraint on using domestic cloth. However, under the pressure from domestic
textile rms,SAARC cumulation was not rectied by the Bangladeshi government in 2004.
10Of 1320 million meters of total demand in 2001, only 190 was supplied locally in wovens according to
a study by Development Initiative in 2005.
11See Table 33 in Development Initiative (2005).
12In contrast, India has the ability to meet its woven cloth needs domestically at competitive prices so that
its rms can avail themselves of GSP preferences in the EU. As a result, Bangladeshi rms nd themselves
at a disadvantage in woven garments.
13We could not estimate documentation costs separately from other xed costs of exporting if all rms
choose to meet ROOs as in non-wovens. This is the main reason why we focus on the woven sector here.
14See Rahman and Bhattacharya (2000) for more on this.
92.2 The Data
We use customs data at the transaction level for the scal year 2004 as our main source.
This has information on sales, quantity, product (at the HS 8 level), weight, currency of
transaction as well as on a destination and a rm identier. Since the customs data has
no information on whether preferences were invoked or not, we obtained a list of rms that
export woven apparel to the EU and obtain preferences for their exports. For these rms, we
got information on their exports of wovens to the EU, their quantity and price. However, the
rm IDs in the two data sets are not the same. To match the rms, we did the following. In
our customs data, we aggregated the sales per rm to the EU of woven apparel, the quantity
exported to the EU, and its unit value over the scal year. We then matched the rms
according to sales and quantity.15
3 The Model
We develop a simple partial equilibrium setting based on the setup in Melitz (2003), to which
we add another dimension of rm heterogeneity: rm and market specic demand shocks.
Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) use the same setup to see how rms with dierent
productivities, facing these demand shocks, are predicted to sort themselves and behave as a
result of dierences in taris, quotas, and ROOs of the EU and US. The way in which they
do so is shown to be consistent with the model. For example, they nd that, as predicted by
the model, the probability a rm only exports to the EU falls with increases in productivity,
favorable demand shocks in the US, and adverse demand shocks in the EU. Conversely, the
probability a rm exports to both the EU and US rises with increases in productivity and
favorable demand shocks in the US and EU. They also found evidence suggesting those rms
that only export to the US (whose presence is impossible without demand shocks) are mainly
driven by favorable demand shocks in the US together with adverse demand shocks in the
EU, but not by productivity. The fact that the predictions of the model are seen in the data
15There is little need to worry about mismatches that might have occured in this procedure as we only
match the share of rms that meet ROOs in our estimation procedure.
10allows us to use it in a structural estimation procedure with a fair degree of condence that
it is not being arbitrarily imposed on the data.
While we explicitly model a small open economy partial equilibrium, Melitz (2003) has
a general equilibrium model. We do not have the data to condently estimate a general
equilibrium model and for this reason we stick to partial equilibrium and make the equivalent
of a \small country" assumption as explained in more detail later. We also focus only on the
US and EU as export markets and do not model the domestic Bangladeshi market at all.
The US and EU are most of the Bangladeshi export market and our rms do not produce
much (about 3%) for the domestic market. This is not surprising as the domestic market
demands dierent products from those exported.
We rst set up the demand side, where we describe preferences and how we incorporate
demand shocks into the model. Then we explain the timing of decisions and model how
rms behave in the presence of ROOs. Following this, we outline the equilibrium conditions
in our partial equilibrium model. Next, we explain how we estimate our model and provide
our estimation results. Finally, we explain the counterfactuals we run and what they mean.
3.1 Utility
Utility in country j; j 2 fUS;EUg; is given by
Uj = (Nj)
1  (Cj)
 ; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where Nj is a competitively produced numeraire good, which is freely traded and takes a unit
of eective labor to produce. Cj can be thought of as the services produced by consuming














j is the set of trading partners for country j: Xij denotes the services produced by the
exports of a trading partner i to country j that produces and sells a continuum of varieties
indexed by !. q(!) is the quantity consumed and v(!) is the demand shock for variety !: A











ij is the set of varieties from country i available to consumers in country j; and
j = 1=(1   j) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties produced by
country i for export to country j. We can derive the demand function for a variety qij (!)




pij(!)qij (!)d! s.t. Xij = 1: (4)
This gives the unit input requirement of the variety needed to make a util denoted by aij(!) :













Then the demand is






Thus, our demand function looks just like the standard one  a la Melitz, except it has a
multiplicative demand shock.
It is worth emphasizing that the above specication implies that the expenditure on all
the dierentiated goods taken together will be constant. Thus, any increase in Bangladeshi
exports must come at the expense of producers from other countries.16
16Had we allowed greater substitutability between C and N, we would have generated larger responses
to policies that enhanced Bangladeshi competitiveness with a less adverse impact on other suppliers.
123.2 Pricing and Equilibrium
Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity as well as their demand shocks. The pro-
duction structure is summarized in Figure 1. Bangladeshi rms rst pay fe in order to get
their productivity draw  from the productivity distribution G(): After observing ; they
decide whether to enter the US and/or EU markets and pay a xed cost of fUS
m and fEU
m ;
respectively. Once entered, they see the market specic demand shocks, vUS and vEU; drawn
from distributions Hj (v); j 2 fEU;USg; where the draws for each rm are independent
across markets. This assumption is convenient as it allows us to separate the decisions on
entry made by a rm in each market.17 It is also consistent with the facts: the correlation
between the estimates of demand shocks in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) is close to 0:
If rms decide to sell in market j, they incur a xed cost of production, f: If they further
choose to meet ROOs, they pay in addition dj; the documentation cost of meeting ROOs.
A rm's decision on whether to sell in a market or not depends on its value of  and v
in the market. As all varieties are symmetric, while productivities and demand shocks dier
across rms, we can drop ! from our notation, keeping only  and v: A Bangladeshi rm
with productivity  and market demand shock vBD;j in market j will earn revenue





where RBD;j = PBD;jXBD;j is the total sales from Bangladesh and tBD;j is the tari on
Bangladeshi exports by country j: The ad-valorem tari tBD;j is levied on the price so the
rm receives (1   tBD;j)pBD;j per unit sold at the price pBD;j. As the demand shock is
multiplicative, it does not aect the price set by a rm, so that a rm's price depends only
on its productivity. The prots earned by a rm are
BD;j = (1   tBD;j)pBD;j ()qBD;j ()  
wBD;j

qBD;j ()   f (9)
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Figure 1: Production Structure for Bangladeshi Exporters.




while receiving only (1   tBD;j) of their variable prots. As usual, due to the CES framework,
the price paid by consumers is p() = 1
(1 tBD;j)
BD;jw
j :18 We set labor units to be such that
wage (w) is equal to a dollar in our partial equilibrium model. In eect, we assume that w
is xed and this can be rationalized by the existence of labor surplus in Bangladesh. Thus,
all xed costs f; fe; fj
m; and dj are in terms of labor units and are expressed in dollars.
To sell in a market, a rm has to pay a xed production cost f and, if it chooses to meet
ROOs, documentation costs dj as well. However, meeting ROOs could raise direct marginal
costs, and this possibility is allowed for by having direct marginal costs be 1
 when ROOs
18Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) estimate TFP for each rm and show that, as predicted by the
model, the correlation between TFP and price is negative and the shapes of two distributions are very
similar.
14are met. Of course,   1 as ROOs are costly to meet. In addition, there are transportation
costs of the iceberg form BD;j > 1;j 2 fEU;USg; so that marginal costs are increased by
this factor. Finally, to model binding quotas in the US we have marginal cost of an exporter
to the US with productivity  given by (BD;US + )=; where  denotes the price of a quota
license in ad-valorem form (i.e.,  = 0:07).19 As marginal costs remain constant despite these
complications, we can look at the decision-making in each market separately.
3.2.1 Stage 3
As usual, the model is solved backwards. In Stage 3 we can dene the demand shock
v (;PBD;j); which allows a Bangladeshi rm with productivity  to earn zero prots in
market j. As prots are increasing with v in each market, all rms with productivity 
and v  v (;PBD;j) sell in market j: In addition, for the EU market we dene the demand
shock vROO (;PBD;EU) such that additional prots from invoking EU ROOs just cover the
documentation costs of meeting them.20 From the zero prot conditions (see the Appendix
for more detail), the relationship between v (;PBD;EU) and vROO (;PBD;EU) is
v
ROO (;PBD;EU) = C
ROOv (;PBD;EU); (11)





i: If only some rms meet ROOs, CROO > 1: If
CROO  1; then all rms that enter the market meet ROOs. As expected, CROO rises, and
the fraction of rms that meets the ROOs falls, as preferences become less attractive: i.e.,
as taris are lowered, or the documentation costs or marginal costs of meeting preferences
increase. Equation (11) points out that once we know cuto v (;PBD;EU); we also know
the corresponding one for meeting ROOs.
19We model license prices per unit in ad-valorem rather than specic terms to ease the analysis and avoid
severe computational diculties. This specication tends to reduce the tari paid by more productive rms,
as they charge lower prices and so pay a lower dollar tari. Irarrazabal et al. (2010) argue that if trade
barriers are of the per unit form, gains from trade liberalization may be signicantly higher than if they are
of the ad-valorem form.
20Note that there is no such shock for rms in the US market as all Bangladeshi exporters have to meet
US ROOs since the US has country specic quotas.
153.2.2 Stage 2
In Stage 2, we dene productivity 
BD;j of the marginal Bangladeshi rm in market j: For any
; the expected prot from selling in market j is the integral of prots over v  v (;PBD;j).
Firms enter the market
Firms draw demand shock, but stay out
Firms choose






Figure 2: Demand Shock-Productivity Trade-o for the US market.
The rm with 
BD;j is, by denition, indierent between trying to access market j and not
doing so, i.e., its expected prots from accessing market j are equal to the xed cost fj
m.21
As expected, prots rise with : only rms with  > 
BD;j earn non-negative prots on
average once their demand shocks are realized, and hence, only such rms try their luck
in market j. This gives the cuto productivity 
BD;j in terms of the model's parameters.
(See equations (47) and (48) in the Appendix.) Knowing 
BD;j and v (;PBD;j) allows us to
depict the trade-o between the demand shocks and productivities of rms in each market
as done in Figures 2 and 3, where a downward sloping locus reects the fact that the demand
shock needs to be really low to force a very ecient rm to exit the market.
21The expected prots for the EU market consist of 2 parts: the expected prots from exporting without
ROOs and those from invoking ROOs multiplied by the probability of getting high enough demand shock.
163.2.3 Stage 1
In Stage 1 we use the free entry condition to derive the mass of entrants in the equilibrium.
Our solutions for 
BD;j; j 2 fEU;USg; depend on the aggregate price indices in the markets.
These price indices fall with increases in the mass of entrants. This reduces prots at any
given  and v; which shifts the cuto locus upward and raises the cuto productivity in each
market, thereby reducing ex-ante expected prots from entry. The equilibrium entry level
is such that the expected prots from entering the industry, obtaining a productivity draw,
and choosing optimally from there onwards equal the cost of doing so, fe: (See equation (49)
in the Appendix.) We will use the model and the available data on Bangladeshi rms to
estimate the model's parameters. The solution of the model is described in the Appendix.
Firms draw demand shock, but stay out
Firms choose
not to enter 
and 
do not pay
Firms enter the market and
pay to meet ROOs 
Firms enter the market,
but do not pay 
to meet ROOs
Figure 3: Demand Shock-Productivity Trade-o for the EU market.
4 Estimation Outline
Identication of the parameters is conditional on a number of basic assumptions stated and
briey discussed below. First, the model is structured so that decisions across markets are
made separately. This simplies the derivations signicantly. However, the assumptions
needed to do so may not hold strictly in the real world. For example, marginal costs may
17not be constant. They could decrease, or the rm could be subject to capacity constraints
so that marginal costs would rise steeply at some point. In addition, incurring some xed
market entry costs may reduce or raise others, or demand shocks may be correlated across
markets so that entering one market may provide information, which could be valuable in
another. We abstract from all such issues and assume all costs are particular to the market
and that there are no such spillovers across markets. Second, we assume the US and EU
markets make up the entire world market for Bangladesh. This is not such a bad assumption
as in 2004 about 93% of total Bangladeshi exports in apparel went to 16 countries in the EU
or to the US. Relaxing this assumption would aect the ex-ante entry condition and tend to
raise the estimate of fe: Third, we make assumptions about the parametric form taken by
the distributions we recover. We assume all entrants draw their productivities (as well as













where  and  are the shape and scale parameters. Such a distribution has a very exible
form: it can approximate the exponential or log normal distributions and, when truncated
as required by the model, closely ts the observed productivity distributions. We denote the
distribution function for productivity shocks by G(); while those for demand shocks are
given by Hj(v); j 2 fUS;EUg.
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We distinguish between what we take as given, the data, and the parameters to be estimated.
For the analysis below, we dene three kinds of rms: rms that sell to the US only (OUS
rms), to the EU only (OEU rms), and to both the EU and US (AUS rms).
4.1.1 Trade Policy Data
We take the values for  (the per-unit cost of meeting ROOs), t (taris), and  (transport
costs) to be set at levels roughly in line with the specics of the market. As ROOs involve
using domestic cloth, which is about 20% more expensive than imported cloth in the woven
18industry, and as roughly 75% of the cost is the cloth, we assume a 15% cost increase from
meeting ROOs and so set  = :85 in wovens. As there are quotas in the US, ROOs must be
met by all rms so that for the US market, we cannot separately estimate documentation
and xed costs. As ROOs are easy to document in the US since only assembly is required,
we set dUS = 0: The quotas in the US have a license price associated with them. As these
quotas are binding, this license price is positive. It has been roughly estimated to be about
7% of costs,22 which is denoted by  below.
In the EU as only some rms meet ROOs, we can estimate d and f separately. Transport
cost estimates for the apparel industry range from a low of about 8%23 to a high of roughly
14%24. We set transport costs of 14% in our estimation. Taris are 12% and 20% in the EU
and US, respectively, and t is set accordingly. This is all summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Trade Policy Parameters
 t tROO  + 
EU 0.85 0.12 0 1.14
US 1 0.2 0.2 1.14 + 0.07
4.2 The Estimation Routine
Thirteen parameters we need to estimate are j; fj
m=f; d=f; fe=f; j; j; TFP; TFP; and
f; j = US;EU: In such procedures, the strategy is to guess the values of the parameters and
generate data from the model given the guesses. The parameters are then chosen to best t
certain moments of the data. In other words, we use the method of moments in estimation.
First, we guess values of all the above parameters. Given these, we can solve numerically
for the cuto values of demand shocks for any given productivity, as well as the cuto
productivity level in each market. (See the Appendix for details.) Once we do this, we
know which rms will actually produce in each market, the price indices in each market, the
shares of OUS/OEU/AUS rms, and the fraction of rms meeting ROOs, and are able to
22In the survey administered by H.L. Kee to a sample of Bangladeshi woven rms the average cost increase
from having to buy a license was 7%, which is in line with estimates in Mlachila and Yang (2004) for 2003.
23World Bank (2005), p. 110.
24See Gajewski and Riley (2006), p. 6.
19generate the distributions of prices, demand shocks, and quantities from the model that are
the counterparts of those we choose to match from the data. We then choose parameters to
make generated data as close to the actual data as possible.
What remains to be specied is the objective function being minimized in the above
procedure. Let us denote vector of parameters by , the k-th percentile of the distribution





k; correspondingly, and the data set we have by X. The moment conditions for the






















where " is the bin size chosen, and I denotes an indicator function. In other words, given





zbk(X;) are the dierences between the fraction of the data in each bin and ": If the
parameters are the true ones, these should have a mean of zero.
Unlike prices and quantity data, information on demand shocks is not readily available
from the data set. We obtain demand shocks from the data as follows. Demand for a rm
(which is its sales in the data) is a function of its own price (from the data), the price index
(obtained from the simulation), the total exports to a given market (from the data), and
the demand shock. This allows us to back out the demand shock for each rm. Let us
denote percentile points of this distribution by
...  1
bk(;X): At the same time, given a vector
of parameters ; we can also recover the model implied distribution of demand shocks for
those rms that survive and its percentile points
...  2
bk(;X). We minimize the dierence
between the data/model and model implied distributions of demand shocks in the same way




















We use seven bins total for each distribution we match. The rst four bins have 20% of the
25For AUS rms we distinguish between the distributions in each market and give them an equal weight.
20data in each bin, and the next three bins have 10%, 7.5%, and 2.5% of the data, respectively.26
Finally, we denote the shares of rms (in percentages) that are of the OEU, AUS, and
OUS types in the data by Se
b: Similarly, let Se
ROO denote the share of rms (in percentages)
that meet EU ROOs in the data. The moment condition for the share of AUS rms is:
m
Share
z;AUS(X;) = I [Firm z is AUS;]   S
e
AUS:
I [Firm z is AUS] equals unity if rm z is an AUS rm in the simulation. This occurs if its
productivity is above the cut-o level for the tougher market and demand shock draws are
above the corresponding cut-os for both markets. The expectation of mShare
z;AUS(X;) over
the distributions of productivity and demand shocks for the true parameters should be zero.
The moment conditions for OEU, OUS, and ROOs rms are dened analogously. Stacking
moment conditions for price, quantity, demand shock distributions, and shares of dierent
types of rms yields the vector of moment conditions mz(X;) for rm z.
The choice of which moments to t comes from the need to identify all our parameters. It
is worth providing some intuition on how all the parameters are being identied. Matching
the shares of the dierent types of rms and the distributions of demand shocks for each type
of rms helps identify the parameters of the distributions of demand shocks. Matching the
share of rms meeting ROOs identies documentation costs, while matching the distributions
of prices for each type of rms identies the parameters of the TFP distributions. Matching
the position of the quantity distributions helps pin down xed costs of production. The
value of the elasticity of substitution aects price and, hence, quantity so that matching
quantity distributions for the dierent kinds of rms also helps pin down these parameters.
The shape of the demand shock distribution in a market, in turn, helps pin down the xed
market entry costs as is evident from equations (51) and (52) in the Appendix.
26This choice of bins in essence puts more weight on matching the model and the data for the largest
rms. In this we follow EKK, who similarly match 4 bins - from 0 to 50, from 50 to 75, from 75 to 95, and
from 95 to 100.

















where W is the weighting matrix. Following the literature we start with the unitary weighting
matrix and obtain the set of estimates ^ u of parameters :27 Up to this moment our method
is an example of the classical general method of moments.
With the rst step estimates in hand, we have to calculate the optimal weighting matrix.
Theory proposes the use of the weighting matrix Qmm, where
Qmm = E [m(X;)m(X;)
0];






mz(X; b u)mz(X; b u)
0:
To evaluate b Qmm, we employ a simulation based approach. Based on the rst step estimates
we simulate a large number of articial rms (NA). Knowing prices, quantities, and demand
shocks for these rms, and combining these data with the real data, we calculate moment















To minimize the eect of random sampling error, we take a large number of draws S and





Standard errors for the estimates are obtained using bootstrap techniques. At each of 100
bootstrap iterations we repeat the estimation routine outlined above. Following Horowitz
27We also tried to use a weighting matrix with higher weights on the moment conditions on shares. The
estmation results are similar.
28Following EKK, we use the generalized inverse to calcualte the optimal weighting matrix.
22(1996, 2001) we re-center the moment conditions to achieve the asymptotic renement, even
though we do not use our standard error estimates for testing.
5 Results of the Estimation
The results of the estimation are presented below. Tables 3 and 4 show the estimated
parameters for the TFP and demand shock distributions in the two countries, respectively.
The distributions of quantities, prices, and demand shocks in the data and from the
estimated model are depicted in Figures 4, 5, and 6 in the Appendix, respectively. In these
gures, the model generated data is represented by dashed lines, while the data itself is
represented by solid lines. Our simulations predict a rm size distribution that has a heavier
right tail compared to the data, see Figure 4. Note that in Figure 5 the distribution of prices,
especially for multi market rms, has a larger right tail in the data than in the simulations.29
Table 3. TFP distribution
Estimate Std. Err.
Shape (TFP) 0.81 0.21
Scale (TFP) 0.42 0.15
Implied moments of the distribution
Implied mean shock30 0.47
Coecient of Variation 1.24
The distributions of demand shocks (normalized by their price index) are depicted in
Figure 6. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4. The mean demand
shocks in the US are larger than those in the EU and have a greater coecient of variation.
This is consistent with the dierences in the distribution systems in the two countries. Large
retailers, like Walmart, play a much bigger role in the US than in the EU. Firms that are
lucky enough to land an order from such a large buyer will look like they had a higher
29This may well be due to capacity constraints, which are not present in our model but may be present
in the data. With them, rms may not be able to supply as much as they want to, making the quantity
distributions in the data be to the left, and the price distribution be to the right, of those in the model.
23positive demand shock. It is also consistent with the fact that the US is the older market for
Bangladesh. This ties in with the work of Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008, 2012).
They allow for both TFP and demand shock dierences among rms and argue that younger
rms tend to be at least as productive as old ones, but are smaller, i.e., have smaller demand
shocks. They interpret this in terms of rms having \market capital" (due to advertising or
consumer experience with their goods), which grows slowly over time.
Table 4. Distribution of demand shocks
EU US
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Shape () 0.32 0.008 0.17 0.003
Scale () 1.39 0.087 0.57 0.020
Implied moments
Implied mean shock 10.4 421.8
Coecient of variation 4.9 30.7
Given our estimated distributions, we can check whether the US is a tougher market. To
do this, we compare the probability of being active in the US market versus the EU market
by integrating over the relevant demand and productivity shocks. In our estimates, the
probability of trying the EU (US) market is 17% (13%), while the probability of surviving
conditional on having tried the market is 60% (23%) for the EU (US). These numbers are
consistent with the US being a tougher market and having a larger extent of failed entry.
Table 5. Elasticities of substitution
EU US
 1.34 1.45
Std. Error 0.033 0.027
Table 5 gives the demand elasticities in each market. These are more than unity and
close to the estimates obtained in Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012). They are a little
higher in the US and are similar in magnitude to those found in other structural models like
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2012).
24The estimates of various xed costs are given in Table 6. The costs of entering the
industry are about $77,000, which are about a third of the cost of entering the EU market
and similar in magnitude to the cost of entering the US market. Fixed costs of production
as well as the documentation costs are low. Note that these numbers, when added up, give
a gure close to the sunk cost estimates in Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) for knit wear
(of about .5 million), which is a part of the non-woven apparel industry. Our estimates are,
unfortunately, not directly comparable to theirs for two reasons. First, our numbers are for
a particular subset of wovens, while theirs are for knit wear. Second, our numbers should be
interpreted as annualized values since our model is static.









While interpreting our cost estimates, it is important to understand that they include all
xed costs, sunk and not sunk, monetary, opportunity, or psychic that the producer takes
into account in making decisions. For example, if getting around corrupt ocials to enter
an industry creates costs in terms of bribes, time spent, or headaches, these would show up
in industry entry costs.31
It is worth noting that market entry costs to the EU are quite high. As marginal costs of
exporting to the US are higher than those of exporting to the EU (taris are higher and there
are quotas), xed costs of entering the US market are estimated to be low to help match the
relatively large share of rms (37%) that export to the US. This makes sense in terms of the
institutions as the presence of large US retailers from the US looking for suppliers abroad
31According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, Bangladesh was among the most
corrupt countries in the world. Doing-Business Indicators also consistently place Bangladesh among the
countries with the highest costs of doing business. All of this is consistent with high xed entry costs.
25reduces the xed cost of entering the US market. Conversely, for the EU: despite preferences
and the absence of quotas, the share of rms exporting to the EU is only 60%. As a result,
the EU market entry costs come out to be large. Documentation costs are low, which is
consistent with a large share, 73%, of the rms that export to the EU choosing to meet
ROOs. Fixed cost of production are also estimated to be low to account for the presence of
small exporters. Finally, industry entry costs come from the free entry condition.
It is also worth noting that such a rich structure of xed costs is rarely estimated. Es-
timates for documentation costs, for example, are almost impossible to nd. A strength of
our approach is the ability to provide such estimates.
6 Policy Experiments
Before turning to the policy experiments, we need to outline how the partial equilibrium
assumption is implemented in the simulations. From the estimation procedure, we get price
indices of Bangladeshi rms exporting to the EU and US: (PBD;US)
US 1 and (PBD;EU)
EU 1.
Just as demand for a variety is the product of the variety's share of demand times total











( BD);j is the set of countries exporting to j excluding Bangladesh. RBD;US and RUS
are approximated by the total Bangladeshi sales and total exports of woven apparel to the





by  P BD;US: We can obtain  P BD;EU in an analogous manner.32 In our simulations, we
keep  P BD;EU and  P BD;US xed in accordance with our partial equilibrium assumptions,
as we assume that Bangladesh is a small country. However, it is worth exploring what is
being missed by making this assumption. We argue below that this would result in under
32Note that even if we assume that instead of the term  P i;j we have the price indices for other countries









1 i;j will be solved for exactly the same way as the  P i;j:
26estimating the eects of policy on exports, while over estimating the eect of consumer
surplus. Consider a policy that reduces PBD;EU: This will raise Bangladeshi exports, while
reducing the prots of non-Bangladeshi rms and causing their exit. This, in turn, would
raise  P BD;EU; making Bangladeshi exports even more competitive. This argument suggests
that the Bangladeshi export increases due to the policy (that reduced PBD;EU to begin with)
that are predicted by our simulations would tend to be under estimates. However, because
 P BD;EU would rise, while the simulations assume it is xed, the consumer surplus gain
in the EU would be over estimated in our simulations. In addition, as Bangladesh has a
small share of the world market, there is an asymmetry that is worth noting. Any change in
PBD;EU will evoke a small response in  P BD;EU: However, even a small change in  P BD;EU
will have large eects on Bangladeshi demand. It is also worth emphasizing that the increases
in exports of Bangladesh would tend to come at the expense of other exporters. Thus, EU
preferences to less developed countries including Bangladesh may end up hurting a possibly
even poorer countries in Africa as Bangladesh is likely to be able to better take advantage
of such preferences than some other developing countries.33
In our experiments below, we distinguish between \endogenous license price" and \exoge-
nous license price" scenarios. We transform the license price for a quota into its ad-valorem
equivalent in the model. In the presence of quotas, policy changes will aect the license price
and its ad-valorem equivalent. In the \exogenous" scenario, we keep the license price xed.
In the \endogenous" one, we allow the equilibrium value of the license price to change. For
each experiment we rst check whether the US quota remains binding or not. If it is no
longer binding, we set the new license price to be zero. If it remains binding, we nd the
license price that equates the demand for quota licenses at the new license price to the xed
supply of licenses. This keeps the quantity sold by Bangladeshi rms to the US constant.
We are now ready to look at some policy questions. Our rst experiment deals with
33In our tables, we calculate welfare changes directly using indirect utility normalized so that the marginal
utility of a dollar of income is unity. We use estimates of $12,465 and $11,855 billion dollars for the EU
and US GDP in 2004 taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2012 Edition), tari
revenues of $105 and $308 million dollars collected by the EU and US, respectively, and their expenditure
shares of 0.00024 and 0.0005 on woven apparel in our calculations.
27a question of considerable policy importance, namely, the costs of preferences. Developed
countries typically give preferences to developing ones, but require that exporters meet origin
requirements as done by the EU in the EBA. Thus, obtaining preferences can be quite costly.
Consequently, such preferences can be much less generous than they seem. We use our model
to quantify the impact of making such preferences easier/harder to obtain.34 We show, for
example, that removing the home yarn requirement results in a surge of entry and exports.
The second set of experiments looks at the policy eectiveness of subsidies to xed costs.
Which subsidies are the most eective in terms of promoting exports? This is relevant for
developing countries for a number of reasons. Foreign exchange may be valuable in itself due
to the existence of a \foreign exchange gap." Also, exports may provide needed tax revenues,
or more generally, may be a source of externalities. To examine this question, we look at
the eectiveness of a given dollar value of a subsidy to dierent kinds of xed costs as in
Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007). We consider both the short run eects (when the mass of
entrants is xed at the level before the policy change) and long run eects (when everything,
including the mass of entrants, adjusts) and nd that they can go in opposite directions.
We also look at welfare and revenue eects. Our work suggests that in the absence of any
response from other countries, as might be expected for a small country (with the given price
index of competing products), a fall in the xed costs rms face can greatly increase their
exports. We discuss the reason for this and provide a decomposition of the relevant margins.
An interesting and novel nding is that liberalization in one country can raise rather
than lower its exports in the other market as would be expected a priori. These cross market
eects are very large. Also, while the eects of changes in trade policies in most standard
models give welfare changes in the millions, the welfare changes our model generates are
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Dixit (1988) argues that the magnitude of welfare
changes is in the billions only when there are large pre-existing distortions in other markets
like those created by labor unions setting articially high wages. However, in our model free
entry magnies the eects of trade policies, generating changes in the hundreds of millions
rather than in the millions, even though the sector we are using accounts for a small part of
34Mattoo et al. (2003) look at the Africal Growth and Opportunity Act and (based on back of the
envelope calculations in a simple competitive model) argue that preferences are undone by restrictive ROOs.
28expenditure. Of course, these eects are muted in the endogenous license price scenario.
We report the eects on Bangladesh focusing on the change in its exports. How might
Bangladeshi welfare be aected by increases in exports? The average wage in wovens in
2003 is about $530 per year, while GDP per capita is $334. The sales to employment ratio
is $4,876 per worker, so an additional $10,000 of exports creates 2 jobs, with a rent of about
$196 per job, resulting in a welfare gain of $392 per $10,000 increase in Bangladeshi exports.
6.1 Documentation Costs, Preferences, and ROOs
The preferences given to Bangladeshi exporters by the EU in the woven industry are costly
for two reasons. First, there is the requirement of using more expensive domestic fabric.
Second, there are documentation costs involved (see Table 6).
6.1.1 Long Run Eects
We begin by considering the eects of series of policies in the long run, i.e., when entry
has time to occur. Table 7 looks at four policy changes and their eects in the long run
(i.e., when entry adjusts). Most of the table deals with the endogenous quota price scenario,
though the last few rows describe the key outcomes for the exogenous quota price scenarios.
Column 1 describes the outcome under the status quo. Column 2 looks at the eect of
eliminating preferences. This involves making the tari in the EU 12% for all Bangladeshi
rms.35 Column 3 shows the eects of doubling documentation costs. Column 4 captures
the eect of policies, like regional cumulation,36 which make ROOs less costly to meet. To
approximate this, we make ROOs costless to meet in terms of marginal production costs in
wovens.37 Finally, Column 5 gives the eect of removing the documentation costs and the
marginal cost of meeting ROOs.
35In calculating welfare changes, we add the net increase in tari revenues from Bangladeshi and from
non-Bangladeshi rms as predicted by the model. Details of the calculations are available on request.
36For example, if cheap Indian cloth could be used in production without compromising Bangladeshi
origin, costs of meeting ROOs would fall.
37Bombarda and Gamberoni (forthcoming) focus on such issues in the context of the Pan European system
of cumulation that the EU FTA partners have to respect to gain preferential access to the European market.
29All reductions in costs make Bangladeshi rms more optimistic about their expected
prots, and hence, the mass of entrants rises. In addition, more relaxed EU ROOs allow a
greater share of Bangladeshi exporters to meet them. This eect also expands the market
share of Bangladeshi exporters in the EU market. There are also cross-market eects that are
particularly pronounced when the quota price is xed. This emphasizes the role of existing
quotas in limiting the ecacy of trade liberalization elsewhere. A more liberal policy in
the EU results in a greater mass of entrants into the industry, which raises Bangladeshi
exporters' share in the US market and reduces the price index there. Quotas in the US blunt
such eects reducing the impact of unilateral liberalization on the part of the EU.
An important thing to note in Tables 7 is that despite ROOs being costly to meet, the
industry relies greatly on the presence of the EU preferences. Our model suggests that in
the absence of these preferences, as shown in Column 2, entry would fall considerably. If the
quota price is xed, entry falls, EU imports from Bangladesh fall from $482 million to $262
million as do US imports from $233.6 million to $136 million, highlighting the cross-market
eects of the EU policies. When quota prices are endogenous, the fall in entry reduces the
US quota price so that the fall in entry is lower than in the exogenous quota price scenario.
As a result, EU imports fall by less, to only $330 million. US imports fall as well (to $206
million), and the quota becomes non-binding.
Doubling documentation costs (Column 3 of Table 7) also reduces EU imports (to $475
million, -1.5%) and US imports (to $233.4 million, -0.1%) in the endogenous quota price
case. Note this is a far smaller eect than the removal of preferences. With exogenous quota
prices, the exit induced is larger so that the fall in EU and US exports is more pronounced
than when the quota price adjusts. The reason why raising documentation costs by a factor
of two has a relatively small eect is that these have a limited eect on entry and operate
through their eect on marginal rms choosing to use ROOs. Their impact is, thus, limited.
Policies that aect marginal costs (like removal of preferences, as in Column 2, or reducing
the cost of meeting preferences, as in Column 4) aect entry to a greater extent, and hence,
rms of all types, and tend to have more bang than ones that aect only marginal rms.
When the home yarn requirement is removed as in Column 4 so that preferences are not
costly to obtain, both EU and US imports rise. The model suggests this would result in
30exports to the EU of $565 million (+17.1%) and to the US of $236.1 million (+1.1%) when
the quota price adjusts, and by 22.7% and 14.3% when the quota price is xed.38
Finally, when both the marginal and xed costs of meeting ROOs are removed (Column
5), the eects are slightly more pronounced: with endogenous (exogenous) quota prices,
exports rise by 19% (25.5%) and 1.2% (16.1%) to the EU and US, respectively.
38In 2011, the EU changed its ROOs to require only one stage of processing to occur in the exporting
country to obtain origin.
31Table 7. Long-run equilibrium implications of policy changes (values in dollars)
Baseline No preferences Higher doc. costs No home yarn req. Costless pref.
Tari in EU (tBD;EU) 12% 12% 12% 12% 0%
Tari in EU, ROO (tROO
BD;EU) 0% 12% 0% 0% 0%
Tari in US (tBD;US) 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Cost disadvantage () 0.85 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00
Documentation costs (dEU=f) 0.66 0.00 1.32 0.66 0.00
Endogenous quota price case
Change in quota price in US, %
Change in quota price in US 0.070 -100% -5.7% +43.4% +49.3%
Change in Bangladeshi exports, %
EU imports from Bangladesh 482.3m -31.7% -1.5% +17.1% +19.0%
US imports from Bangladesh 233.6m -11.9% -0.1% +1.1% +1.2%
Change in mass of entrants, %
Implied mass of entrants 4,712 -22.3% -0.7% +5.8% +6.6%
Change in productivity cutos, %
Productivity cuto in EU 0.8508 +15.9% +0.91% -6.06% -7.42%
Productivity cuto in US 1.0355 -6.8% -0.34% +2.61% +2.97%
Change in demand shock cutos, %
Demand shock cuto in EU 0.1866 -10.24% -0.59% +5.55% -10.24%
Demand shock cuto in US 6.9570 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Share of rms invoking ROO, %
Share of ROO rms (model) 70.2% 0% 57.0% 77.7% 100%
Change in EU and US price indices, %
Price index in EU 100% +19.1% +0.87% -9.38% -10.41%
Price index in US 100% +1.1% +0.01% -0.10% -0.11%
Change in tari revenues, %
Tari revenue in EU 447k +8,742% +125.9% -34.2% -100%
Tari revenue in US 46,728k -11.9% -0.1% +1.1% +1.2%
Change in welfare, $
Change in welfare in EU ($) | -480,935k -25,208k 293,418k 327,162k
Change in welfare in US ($) | -68,538k -709k 6,191k 6,964k
Exogenous quota price case
Change in Bangladeshi exports, %
EU imports from Bangladesh 482.3m -45.5% -2.24% +22.7% +25.5%
US imports from Bangladesh 233.6m -41.6% -1.94% +14.3% +16.1%
Change in EU and US price indices, %
Price index in EU 100% +28.15% +1.28% -12.39% -13.8%
Price index in US 100% +3.84% +0.18% -1.30% -1.5%
Change in mass of entrants, %
Implied mass of entrants 4,712 -45.5% -2.3% +16.9% +19.0%
Change in welfare, $
Change in welfare in EU ($) | -707,594k -37,343k 393,918k 441,279k
Change in welfare in US ($) | -238,328k -11,193k 82,661k 92,933k
32When exporting becomes less promising, the direct eect on prots in the EU is negative,
which raises the productivity cuto there. However, there is a fall in entry of Bangladeshi
rms that raises the price index in both the US and EU (as evident in Table 7), making
prots swing upwards, which, in turn, acts to reduce the cuto productivity. The former
eect dominates in the EU, while in the US, only the latter operates so that the cuto falls.
Giving preferences results in substantial eects (both in the US and EU), even when
there are restrictive ROOs, compared to back of the envelope calculations that ignore the
role of entry like Mattoo et al. (2003). Our numbers for eects on trade and welfare below
are larger because entry does most of the heavy lifting in such experiments. It is also worth
emphasizing that when the quota price is endogenous, the eects are qualitatively similar,
but muted, suggesting that quotas maintained by the US may have signicantly hindered
the ability of the EU to help Bangladeshi exports. At the same time, since US quotas are
product and country specic, they insulate Bangladesh from competition by others.
6.1.2 Long Run Welfare Consequences
What about welfare eects of these policies? There are two main channels through which
policy regarding Bangladesh aects welfare of the EU households: via consumer surplus and
tari revenue. Changing policies impacts the value of tari revenues, TREU, earned by the
EU both through the number of Bangladeshi exporters who pay a tari and through the



















1 EU =  P BD;EU. Recall that  P BD;EU was calculated earlier
and is held xed at this level in our counterfactual experiments. However, (PBD;EU)
1 EU
changes as we change the EU policies. The eect on tari revenue and the percentage change
in the price index are reported in Table 7.
When the quota price adjusts (does not adjust) removing preferences given to Bangladesh
by the EU decreases EU welfare by roughly $481 ($708) million dollars. Thus, it giving
33preferences is in the EU's own narrow self interest. The removal of preferences reduces ex-
ante prots and, hence, entry. This reduction in the mass of entrants results in a large fall
in exports to both the EU and US, with a consequent fall in consumer surplus and tari
revenue. Removing EU preferences reduces US welfare by about $69 million when quota
prices adjust and by $238 million when they do not. Thus, there are positive spillovers to
the US of the EU liberalization, and negative spillovers of the US quota on the EU.
When documentation costs are raised, ex-ante prots fall as does the mass of entry. This
raises prices, which acts to reduce surplus, but as fewer rms invoke ROOs, tari revenues
increase, raising welfare. The former eect dominates when the quota price adjusts so that
welfare in the EU falls by about 25 million dollars, while welfare in the US decreases by about
0.7 million dollars. Finally, removing the home yarn requirement raises ex-ante prots, and,
hence, entry, with consequent increases in surplus and tari revenue. Note that welfare rises
in both the US and EU by 293 million and 6 million dollars, respectively. Removing the
documentation costs as well in Column 5 raises welfare even more. As expected, all eects
are larger when the quota price is exogenous as can be seen in Table 7.
6.1.3 Short Run Results
Table 8 looks at the same policy changes, but limits the analysis to the short run. In
calculating these impact eect estimates, we turn o the entry channel and look at the eect
on rms that have already decided to be in an industry and market. Hence, we keep the mass
of rms that enter the industry and the productivity cuto of rms that enter a particular
market xed at their initial estimated levels and allow the experiment only to aect the
position of the productivity-demand shock trade-os, and via this, all other variables.
Preferences and Documentation Costs Before we begin, note that as dened, the price
charged, pj(); is the price consumers pay. Firms give part of what consumers pay to the
government. In the short run, without preferences pj() = 1
(1 tij) while with preferences it
is 1
: Since taris are 12%, ((1   tij) = :88), while the cost disadvantage is 15% ( = :85),
the price paid by consumers falls when preferences are removed! This is what lies behind the
fall in the price index when preferences are removed. It also raises the sales of Bangladeshi
34rms and their share in EU imports but reduces the revenues after taris which results in
exit in the long run.39 Tari revenues rise quite considerably in the short run, but this will
only be temporary. Note that the welfare eects in the short run are the opposite of those
in the long run as we have turned o the main channel, namely, entry/exit.
Table 8. Short-run equilibrium implications of policy changes.
Baseline No preferences Higher doc. costs No home yarn req. Costless pref.
Tari in EU (tBD;EU) 12% 12% 12% 12% 0%
Tari in EU, ROO (tROO
BD;EU) 0% 12% 0% 0% 0%
Cost disadvantage () 0.85 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00
Relative doc. costs (dEU=f) 0.66 0.00 1.32 0.66 0.00
Change in mass of rms, %
Mass of successful exporters to EU 485 0.00% 0.00% -0.21% -0.21%
Change in demand shock cuto, %
Demand shock cuto in EU 0.1866 +0.37% 0.00 +0.37% +0.37%
Change in price index in EU, %
Aggregate price index in EU 100% -1.63% -1.09% -3.67% -3.68%
Change in tari revenues collected, %
Tari revenues in EU 447k +12,964% +130% -43.0% -100%
Change in Bangladeshi exports
Bangladeshi exports, RBD;EU 482.3m +0.97% +0.01% +4.64% +4.65%
Change in revenues of Bangladeshi rms
Revenue of Bangladeshi rms 481.8m -11.06% -0.11% +4.68% +4.75%
Change in welfare
Change in welfare in EU ($) | 107,433k 33,712k 111,610k 111,627k
Documentation costs do not aect marginal costs but make some rms choose not to
meet ROOs. As not meeting ROOs reduces cost and price, the overall price index falls
slightly. As a result, Bangladeshi sales rise, though their revenues (net of taris) fall.
With no home yarn requirement, more rms meet ROOs and as there is no marginal cost
disadvantage associated with doing so, their prices fall. As a result, the price index falls.
Their sales rise as do their revenues. With costless preferences, there is an additional eect
as all rms meet ROOs. In all the experiments, welfare in the EU rises. In Columns 2 and
3 of Table 8, the driving forces are a rise in consumer surplus and tari revenues, while in
Columns 4 and 5 welfare rises despite a fall in tari revenues.
It is worth emphasizing the dierence in the long run export eects (both in the US and
EU) of preferences, even when there are restrictive ROOs, and the short run ones in Table
39Of course, as entry is xed, there are no eects on the US market so we ignore it for the time being.
358. Back of the envelope calculations that ignore the role of entry like Mattoo et al. (2003)
as well as more sophisticated calculations based on models with the xed mass of entrants40,
could easily underestimate these long run eects, or even get the eect on welfare reversed.
6.2 Subsidizing Fixed Costs
Which xed costs should be subsidized? Is there a dierence? Table 9 looks at this question in
terms of promoting exports. It compares the eectiveness of a given dollar value ($1,500,000)
of a subsidy to dierent kinds of xed costs. In this, it follows Das, Roberts and Tybout
(2007). The results suggest the export eects vary considerably depending on where the
subsidy is applied. A policy maker wanting to raise exports would get up to a $25 ($81)
increase in export revenue for every dollar spent reducing xed costs when the quota price
is endogenous (exogenous). In general, applying the subsidy at a later stage so that it is not
wasted on rms that end up exiting produces greater results. Thus, subsidies to market entry
are the least ecient (with $.4 increase in exports per dollar spent), while compensating xed
costs of production raises exports the most (by $24.8 per dollar spent). Also, subsidizing
market entry costs for markets, where the market share is lower, gives more leverage as rms
can \steal" business from a greater fraction of competitors. Thus, subsidizing US entry with
the Bangladeshi market share around 4% gives $11.4 per dollar spent, while doing the same
for the EU with Bangladeshi market share around 16% gives only $5.5.
We also nd that cross market eects are large: if the EU market entry is subsidized,
the US exports (and tari revenue) rise but only when the quota price is exogenous. As
expected, these eects are much more muted when the quota price is endogenous. Thus,
policies have large cross market eects, though quotas dilute these eects considerably.
6.3 The Responsiveness of Trade Flows to Trade Barriers
It is worth explaining how we get such a large eect on exports given there is free entry.
First, subsidies raise the mass of entrants considerably. Second, spillover eects of policies
across markets magnify the export increase due to any given increase in entry.
40Recall this assumption is made in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) and Chaney (2008).
36Table 9. Fixed costs compensation: Government spends $1.5 million (2%).
Baseline Industry EU market US market Documentation Fixed
case entry costs entry costs entry costs costs Costs
$ compensation per rm / entrant | 318 1,826 2,328 3,192 2,117
Endogenous quota price case
Change in quota price in US, %
Quota price in the US +1.43% +3.67% +61.3% +2.85% +98.6%
Change in Bangladeshi exports,%
EU imports from Bangladesh 482.3m +0.11% +1.68% +1.30% +1.37% +6.54%
US imports from Bangladesh 233.6m +0.04% +0.08% +5.78% +0.06% +3.19%
Change in mass of rms,%
Implied mass of entrants into industry 4712 +0.22% +0.47% +2.62% +0.39% +12.34%
Change in productivity cutos, %
Productivity cuto for EU 0.8508 +0.06% -1.16% +0.74% -0.95% +3.25%
Productivity cuto for US 1.0355 +0.09% +0.22% -3.52% +0.17% +4.37%
Change in demand shock cutos, %
Demand shock cuto in EU 0.1856 0.00% +0.72% 0.00% +0.58% -32.9%
Demand shock cuto in US 6.9570 0.00% 0.00% +3.48% 0.00% -32.6%
Share of rms invoking ROOs, %
Share of ROOs rms (model) 70.2% 70.2% 70.2% 70.2% 95.4% 58.6%
Change in tari revenues, %
Tari revenue in EU 447k +0.12% +2.14% +1.49% -93.14% +86.26%
Tari revenue in US 46,728k +0.04% +0.08% +5.78% +0.06% +3.19%
Change in EU and US price indices, %
Price index in EU 100% -0.06% -0.95% -0.74% -0.78% -3.67%
Price index in US 100% -0.004% -0.01% -0.53% -0.01% -0.29%
Change in welfare, $
Change in welfare in EU ($) | 1,887k 28,533k 22,077k 22,782k 111,733k
Change in welfare in US ($) | 241.3k 456.6k 33,409k 367.6k 18,403k
Policy eciency (dollars of extra net exports per dollar of subsidy)
Policy eciency | 0.4 5.5 11.4 4.8 24.8
Exogenous quota price case
$ compensation per rm / entrant 317 1,820 2,001 3,185 1,912
Change in Bangladeshi exports, %
EU imports from Bangladesh 482.3m +0.28% +2.07% +8.59% +1.76% +14.69%
US imports from Bangladesh 233.6m +0.46% +1.04% +23.6% +0.95% +27.75%
Change in EU and US price indices, %
Price index in EU 100% -0.16% -1.17% -4.80% -1.00% -8.12%
Price index in US 100% -0.04% -0.10% -2.14% -0.09% -2.50%
Change in welfare, $
Change in welfare in EU ($) | 4,808k 35,173k 146,585k 29,402k 252,637k
Change in welfare in US ($) | 2,643k 6,019k 136,785k 5,497k 159,761k
Policy eciency (dollars of extra net exports per dollar of subsidy)
Policy eciency | 1.5 8.3 57.1 7.1 81.2
37When subsidies attract rms into the industry, these entrants export not just to the EU,
but wherever they have a good demand shock. This is in contrast to what happens in simple
competitive settings, where the EU preferences given to Bangladesh would raise exports to
the EU but reduce them to the US. Third, due to demand shocks, the marginal and average
rms are large. Without shocks, variable prots of the marginal rm just cover its xed
costs of production. With demand shocks, this is true only at the cuto demand shock for
each rm in the economy. Hence, at all demand shocks above the cuto one, the rm with
the cuto productivity has higher prots and sales than it needs to produce. Thus, the
marginal and average rms tend to be larger in the presence of demand shocks. This also
helps explain why exports rise greatly with rising mass of rms. Finally, we look at small
interventions. The ecacy of the intervention declines with its size as marginal returns fall.
6.3.1 The Relevant Margins
We want to decompose export changes due to policy in our counterfactuals into their com-
ponent parts. The basic idea is quite simple. We ask how much of the exports change is
due to changes in the exports of existing rms (the intensive margin), how much is due to
changes in cutos (the extensive margin via cutos), and how much is due to the entry of
rms (the extensive margin via entry).
Let total exports be X. Let x denote the exports of an individual rm. Total exports
dier in the two periods, 0 and 1; as the mass, productivity, and demand shock cutos
change, which results in the changes of exports per rm. The change in total exports can

























0;1;v1;x1)] via Entry), (18)
where X(Me
1;1;v1;x1) denotes total exports when Me
1 mass of rms enter, the productivity
38and demand shock cutos are those in period 1; and the output per rm corresponds to that
in period 1: Similarly, X(Me
0;0;v1;x1) denotes total exports when Me
0 mass of rms enter,
the productivity cutos for entry and for each market are that in period 0; while the demand
shock cutos in each market for each productivity correspond to those in period 1:
What would we expect to happen through these margins? Any policy will have an impact
on exports via the exports of existing rms, i.e., the intensive margin. In addition to the
direct eect on exports of the policy, changes in the price index in response to the policy
will also aect the exports of existing rms. If, for example, the price index of Bangladeshi
apparel falls, each Bangladeshi rm faces more competition from other Bangladeshi rms
and this lowers the aggregate price index. This force works to reduce an existing rm's
exports at any given price, which is captured in the intensive margin in our decomposition.
In our simulations, independent of what they are, the exports of existing rms do not change
very much in response to policy, so that this intensive margin counts for little. In addition,
the changes in entry aect the price index via the extensive margin in terms of the demand
shock and productivity cutos. Again, these eects tend to be small. For example, when
quotas are exogenous, new entrants drive over 78% of the increase in exports.
The question still remains how such a small subsidy could result in such a large increase
in entry. The answer is that the relationship between prots ex-ante and the mass of rms
is very at in the estimated model. As the mass of rms that enter rises, prots fall o very
slowly. A subsidy, for example, shifts these ex-ante prots upwards. As the above mentioned
curve is at, even a small shift up results in a large change in the intersection of the curve
with the x axis (which is the zero prot condition pinning down entry). This curve is likely to
be at when Bangladeshi rms are a small part of the world's exports (so that there are a lot
of other exporters to steal consumers away from) and when  is low so that rms make room
for themselves in the market since they produce unique products. Simulations revealed that
this is indeed the case: as the share of Bangladesh in exports rises, the increase in exports in
this kind of a simulation falls very fast. This suggests that developing countries, especially
small ones, whose exports are not large enough to disrupt markets, might be able to raise
exports a lot by focusing on policies that reduce entry costs of various kinds. These polices
need not even be subsidies. Nor do they need to be very costly to implement. For example,
39promoting export fairs that allow buyers and sellers to meet more easily could reduce xed
costs of exporting, as could workshops on how to institute the quality requirements needed
by foreign buyers. Putting the needed documentation for obtaining preferences on the web to
reduce documentation costs is another example of a potentially low cost, high return policy.
6.3.2 The Role of 
What is the relation between the estimated low values of  and the predominance of the
entry channel we nd? Krugman (1980) predicts that in a homogeneous rm setup, low 
makes demand inelastic, reducing the impact of trade barriers on trade ows. In other words,
the eect of trade barriers via the intensive margin is weak when substitution is limited.
Chaney (2008) argues that a low elasticity of substitution between goods magnies the
eect of trade barriers on trade ows when rm heterogeneity is added to the model. Note
this is exactly the opposite of what Krugman predicts. In the presence of rm heterogeneity,
there are additional eects via productivity cutos. Trade barriers raise prices and, in turn,
the price index. The increased price index allows less productive rms to survive. When 
is low, such rms are not at a severe disadvantage, as their products dier considerably from
those of other rms. Hence, these rms can sell a good deal so that with low  trade ows
are very responsive to trade barriers via the extensive margin. In other words, when  low,
the extensive margin eects on trade ows are strong and dominate in the comparison.
However, Chaney (2008) (and for that matter, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011))
assumes the mass of entrants is xed and so ignores the entry margin completely. When 
is low, the ex-ante prot condition is quite at as new entrant's products do not compete
directly with those of existing rms: their goods make room for themselves in product space.
Thus, trade barriers which shift ex-ante prots will have a large eect on entry and trade
ows. Hence, both cuto and entry margins are more powerful when  is low.
But most of the action on trade ows, at least empirically, comes from the entry margin,
not the cuto or intensive one. Thus, while it is fair to say that the low value of  esti-
mated makes trade ows more responsive to trade barriers, which, in turn, translates into
large leverage for policy in our counterfactual experiments, the channel by which it does so
empirically is not the margin emphasized in Chaney (2008).
407 Conclusion
We provide a simple way of estimating the structural parameters of a heterogeneous rm
model. One of the advantages of our approach is that it uses only cross sectional data to
recover all the structural parameters of the model, including xed costs at dierent levels.
These include entry costs at the industry and market levels as well as xed costs of production
and documentation costs needed to obtain preferences. Moreover, all our estimates seem
reasonable and roughly in line with previous work.
The policy implications inherent in our counterfactual simulations are quite provocative.
We think of these as making a case for \trade as aid." Recently, there have been serious
doubts cast on the ecacy of direct aid. It may be diverted to the pockets of those in power
or used ineectively. Giving aid and having it be eective in terms of growth or a reduction
in poverty are two very dierent things. For example, governments may cut back their own
support for the poor as aid grows. In contrast, \trade aid" works through market forces. For
example, in our application, preferences given by the EU are responsible for a huge increase
in export ows from Bangladesh to the EU and to the US, rather than diverting trade away
from the US market to the EU one if there had been no US quotas (exogenous quota price).
In this manner, trade preferences or other forms of trade facilitation by one country can have
a powerful eect on exports to all markets, and on output, exports, and employment in the
recipient developing country but this eect is sharply attenuated by the presence of quotas
in other importing countries.
Our counterfactuals also suggest where subsidies might be the most eective in increasing
exports. The rule seems to be to subsidize late in the process so that subsidies are not wasted
on failed rms and to subsidize where existing market share is low so that there is more room
to poach from foreign competitors.
It is worth emphasizing that trade aid is a form of aid that can easily create a \win-win-
win" scenario, which is much easier to sell to all parties concerned. The developed country
giving preferences wins as its consumers face lower prices and it still obtains some tari
revenues from those rms that choose not to invoke preferences. Other developed countries
also stand to gain as entry reduces the price of the goods they import so they would not
41have any reason to complain. In addition, the developing country gets to increase its exports,
earning foreign exchange and employing its labor force.
Our results have some lessons for developing and transition countries. Corruption and
bureaucracy raise xed and marginal costs facing by rms. Our work suggests that even
small increases in such costs can result in huge reductions in entry, production, and exports
of a country. Conversely, reining in such costs can do much good. Our work can also be
seen as highlighting the importance of other initiatives that reduce search costs or inherent
uncertainties in the market that raise costs. Thus, export fairs, tribunals for dealing with
complaints about product quality, and other policies that reduce the costs of doing business
in developing countries may have unexpectedly large eects.
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448 Appendix
This Appendix contains the detailed derivations of the equilibrium conditions for the model
described in the paper as well as the way of solving the model numerically. As usual, the
model is solved backwards. We begin with Stage 3:
8.1 Model Derivations
8.1.1 Stage 3: Production Decisions
Exporting to the US Consider a Bangladeshi exporter with productivity  and demand
shock v. The US does not give tari preferences to Bangladeshi garments, and the presence of
country-specic quotas in most categories makes meeting ROOs mandatory for exports. This
means that Bangladeshi rms exporting to the US have no choice but to meet ROOs. (Recall
that we assume that documentation costs are zero in the US and that as only assembly is
required for origin, meeting ROOs is costless so  = 1:) They have to pay the tari of 20%.
As a result, the rm sells quantity












and earns the following revenues and prots:









BD;US (;v) = rBD;US (;v)=US   f: (21)
The price set by a rm does not depend on its market specic shock v. However, v aects
the rm's prots: for any ; there exists a minimal demand shock v (;PBD;US); such that
BD;US (;v (;PBD;US)) = 0; so that from (20); (22)
v (;PBD;US) =
USf




















E denotes the mass of entrants in Bangladesh and 
BD;US is dened below.
Exporting to the EU When Bangladeshi rms export to the EU, they have an additional
choice: invoke ROOs and pay zero taris, or ignore the preferences and pay the tari tBD;EU
without meeting ROOs. If rms meet ROOs, they incur an additional documentation cost
of dEU as well as an increase in marginal costs due to not using the least cost input mix. As
a result, only rms with very favorable demand shocks will choose to meet EU ROOs.






BD;EU (;v) = max
pBD;EU

(1   tBD;EU)pBD;EUqBD;EU (pBD;EU;v)  
BD;EU








































EU : Exporters that do not invoke preferences earn the following revenues and prots:













while exporters that invoke the EU ROOs have
r
ROO


















For any productivity ; we can dene 2 demand shock cutos, v (;PBD;EU) and vROO (;PBD;EU):




do not meet ROOs as their demand shock





nd it worthwhile to meet EU ROOs. The shocks are dened by














where (30) comes from setting the additional prots from invoking EU ROOs to zero. Thus,
v (;PBD;EU) =
EUf




















ROO (;PBD;EU) = C









Note that from (32) and (33), vROO (;PBD;EU) and v (;PBD;EU) are decreasing in :
As shown below, only rms with productivity  > 
BD;j will try to access market j,
where cutos 
BD;j are dened below in the stage 2 problem. Thus, the masses of exporters























8.1.2 Stage 2: Market Entry Decision
Consider a rm who has drawn a productivity level and has to decide whether to enter a
market. Firms who expect non-negative prots from trying to enter market j will do so.











Thus, the expected prot of entering the US market is
















dHUS (v)   f
US
m :
The expected prots of accessing the US market are increasing in ; since v (;PBD;US) is
decreasing in : Denote the productivity of a marginal Bangladeshi rm, which is indierent
between accessing the US market or not, by 
BD;US: Then all rms with  > 
BD;US will try
to access the US market. 




























Equation (37) is important for several reasons. First, by solving it, we obtain the minimal





; which is a key
step in the estimation procedure: Second, it shows that this demand shock does not depend
on the per-unit costs of selling there, only on
fUS
m






; we can express the expected prots at Stage 2 for any
rm as a function of its own productivity  and 
BD;US: To see this, note that from the
















































Thus, the expected prots of a rm depend on its own productivity , the cuto productivity
level, 





; and, of course, the
distribution of demand shocks. Now let us look at the exporters to the EU.
The EU Market As in the US case, for a rm with productivity ;


















































BD;EU (;v)   BD;EU (;v)






















dHEU (v)   f
EU
m :
The careful reader may wonder what ensures that the above maximum of two functions
can be written in this simple way. This follows from the fact that for any ;
v
ROO (;PBD;EU) = C
ROOv (;PBD;EU);
49so that, as long as CROO > 1; at all values of ; the demand shock cuto line in Figure 3
lies below the demand shock cuto line to invoke ROOs.
>From the expression above, the expected prots of accessing the EU market are increas-
ing in ; so if we denote the productivity of a marginal rm exporting to the EU by 
BD;EU;
then all rms with  > 
BD;EU will try to access the EU market. 

























































; we can express the expected










































Moreover, the expected additional prots coming from the possibility of getting a favor-

















































For our estimation exercise, we use the analysis of Stage 2 with the data available to
calculate 
BD;US and 




































8.1.3 Stage 1: Entering the Industry
Entry occurs until the expected prots that could be earned by a Bangladeshi rms in all
































































































8.2 Solving the Model Numerically
Given 13 guessed parameters; how can we solve the model? Take the expression for ex-ante






































(think of this as a number), while the RHS equals one of the parameters we have set. Simi-

















Thus, for xed values of the eleven parameters, equation (51) is a nonlinear equation
in only one unknown, v(
BD;EU;PBD;EU): Similarly, equation (52) is a nonlinear equation
in only one unknown, v(
BD;US;PBD;US): Each has at most one solution as the LHS is
a decreasing function in v(











so that v (BD;j;PBD;j) can now be written as a function of only
52
BD;j and : This is the key in what follows.
Next, we will derive the cuto productivities 
BD;EU and 
BD;US: To solve for the pro-
ductivity cutos, we dene a system of two equations with two unknowns.
The rst relation between productivity cutos: The price index of exporters from






























E is the mass of entrants in Bangladesh. Similarly, the price index of exporters



































Since (;PBD;j) is pinned down once we know 
BD;j; this gives one relation between the
price index ratios and the productivity cutos. Also, D() rises as  falls.
>From the model, we also know that the ratio of the price indices is dened by two zero





































BD;j;PBD;j) is solved for. Then the RHS is a function of the cutos alone.


































RBD;US and RBD;EU are approximated by total Bangladeshi exports of wovens to the





BD;j) falls with 




The second relation between productivity cutos: The second equation we use is
the free entry condition (50). It gives a negative relation between 
BD;EU and 
BD;US: if one
cuto rises, the expected prots from that market decline. To keep ex-ante prots constant,
the expected prots from the other market must rise, i.e., its productivity cuto must fall.
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